The Determinants of Bank Failure: the Evidence from Ukraine and Russia by Bagatiuk, Oksana & Panasenko (Dzhamalova), Valeriya
1  
  
 
 
MASTER-ESSAY 
The Determinants of Bank Failure: the Evidence from 
Ukraine and Russia 
 
 
 
 
Authors:    Oksana Bagatiuk, Valeriia Dzhamalova 
Supervisor:    David Edgerton  
Lund University, Department of Economics 
Seminar date:   June, 4 2009 
  
2  
Abstract 
Title: The Determinants of Bank Failure: the Evidence from Ukraine and Russia 
Seminar date: 2009-06-04 
Authors: Oksana Bagatiuk, Valeriia Dzhamalova  
Advisors: David Edgerton 
Key words: financial ratios, bank failure prediction, cross-country model, linear probability 
model, binary choice models. 
Purpose: To investigate which financial ratios are significant in the prediction of bank failure for 
the sample of Russian and Ukrainian banks and to see if there any similar ratios, which drive the 
bank to bankruptcy in both countries for the first decade of this century. 
Methodology: As an instrument for our analysis we use the linear probability and the binary 
choice models. They are used to analyze the significance of different financial ratios drawn from 
the publicly available annual balance sheets for the period 2002-2008. 
Theoretical perspective: The theoretical framework is the previous research in the field of bank 
failure prediction and credit-risk management methodology. 
 
Conclusions: For the Ukrainian sample the capitalization and profitability measures influence the 
bank failure negatively, as well as a size of the bank. For the sample of Russian banks, the return 
on assets and the loans to total assets ratios are found to have a negative influence on the default, 
in contrast to the capitalization, which positively influence the bankruptcy according to the 
estimated coefficients. Moreover, we conclude that despite some similarities, the differences 
exist in determinants of the banks to failure in two countries; hence the regulatory policy of 
central banks on the local levels still remains the most important for the healthy functioning of 
the banking sector.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1BACKGROUND 
The bankruptcy of any company causes different reactions in society depending on its size and 
publicity. However, the insolvency of financial institutions and banks specifically always is 
alarming. As a default of the bank can cause insolvency of healthy companies, displeasure of 
private customers and as a consequence distrust in the local financial system. That is why 
regulation and overseeing of the banking sector is a major concern of the government of any 
particular country. Moreover, on the international level, the existence of such organization as the 
Bank of International Settlements, which “serves as a bank for central banks,”1 emphasizes the 
importance of banking control not only on the national level but among the countries as well. 
One of the major objectives of this organization is the promotion of monetary and financial 
stability, which is realized through designing the international standards on capital adequacy; the 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision; and the Concordat on cross-border banking 
supervision. 
Among the researchers the question of identifying the factors, which influence the bank failure 
on the local, as well as on the international levels is also brought up. For instance, Mongomery, 
Santoso et al. (2005) find evidence in favour of a cross-country model for Indonesia and Japan in 
comparison with domestic ones2. They use a logit analysis on financial ratios of commercial 
banks. Other economists study macroeconomic variables, which can be associated with systemic 
banking crises in different countries. Among them Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) who 
use multivariate logit for identifying if such factors as inflation, GDP growth, interest rate etc. 
can influence the financial stability of the banks. Using a large sample of developed and 
developing countries in the period from 1980 to 1994, they find that where the macroeconomic 
environment is weak there is a tendency of banking crisis eruption. Many other studies are 
concentrated on the micro-level within one country. For example, Whalen (1991) examines the 
usefulness of proportional hazard model (PHM) as an early warning tool in prediction of 
bankruptcy of the bank. Taking a sample of more than 1500 American banks for the period of 
1987-1990, he finds that the PHM constructed even with quite a small number of explanatory 
variables can serve as an effective early warning tool. Some authors, such as Gonzalez (1999), 
Peresetskiy (2004) recognize both micro- and macro-components as important identifiers of the 
                                                             1 http://www.bis.org/stability.htm 2 In this essay we use the term domestic model when we analyze each country in turn and the term cross-country model when the pooled variables of two countries are analyzed together.  
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distress of the banking sector. The details of these studies as well as a review of other literature 
in this field are presented in Section 3.1. 
 
To continue with clarifying the background for our topic we think it is necessary to give some 
facts which underline the important role of stability of East European banking sector in the 
stability of the whole European financial system. When the Soviet Union broke up, a new huge 
financial market was opened. At the end of the nineties of the last century several large western 
financial groups have entered it. For instance, The Wall Street Journal (February 19, 2009) 
reports that nearly 80 % of the profit of Austrian Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG over the 
past decade came from that region. Austrian banks assets in the region came to about two-thirds 
of the country’s gross domestic product. But at the same time a new profit was associated with a 
new risk. And in February 2009 Moody’s Investors Service Inc. notification about possible 
downgrading of the banks with large investment in Eastern Europe has provoked a sharp drop of 
stock prices of these banks.3 This news was on the front pages of many European newspapers 
and the reason is quite obvious. The banking crisis in Eastern Europe and in ex-Soviet countries 
in particular, may cause considerable credit losses not only inside the region, but also in the 
European Union. Hence, the timeliness and efficiency of the government regulation of the 
banking sector are very crucial for the current situation as well as for the future trust a region 
enjoys among investors. 
 Historically and geographically, Russian and Ukrainian economies are closely related. 
Moreover, the political decision made in one country can provoke the sharp changes in economic 
growth of another country. This argument is illustrated by the example of well-known gas-
conflict. Hence, the State Statistic Committee of Ukraine4 reports that Ukraine's industrial output 
in January 2009 dropped over a 30% compared with a year earlier.  And this is partly a result of 
a cut gas supplies. As Reuters states, “Much of the industry [chemical and petrochemical] 
ground to a halt…when Russia cut gas supplies to Ukraine over a pricing dispute”. 5 
Furthermore, the Russian capital comes up to 21% of the total amount of foreign banking capital 
in Ukraine. And the most important that, in words of Ukrainian media,6 many of these banks 
have the “Kremlin’s tracks”. Thus one of them is under control of Russian government, another 
is subsidiary of central Bank of Russian Federation and lastly, the Vnesheconombank is a state 
corporation, which has the prime-minister of Russia as a head of supervisory board. 
                                                             3 Champion, M., Bart, K., Connaghan C. (2009-02-18), “Eastern Europe Shakes Banks”, The Wall Street Journal (Europe), vol. XXVII No.13. 4 http://ukrstat.gov.ua 5 http://in.reuters.com/article/asiaCompanyAndMarkets/idINLH37296720090217 6 http://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/4a0914d48ee17/ 
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Consequently, the amount of Russian government’s capital in Ukrainian banking sector, as well 
as interdependence of economic processes in two countries let us assume that there are some 
similar factors which can drive the banks to bankruptcy in Russia and Ukraine . And possibly, 
the cross-country analysis of these factors can improve the regulatory arrangements in the field 
of banks bankruptcy. 
 
1.2 SPECIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM 
Taking into consideration the interdependence of financial sectors stability of the former Soviet 
republics and other countries outside the region, common political and economic factors, driving 
the development of Russian and Ukrainian economies; we find it interesting to see if there are 
any similar micro-level financial factors, which are driving the banks in Ukraine and Russia to 
bankruptcy. Moreover, as far as we know there is not much existing research in the field of 
banks failure prediction modeling for the Ukrainian case and our ambition is to fill up this gap.  
1.3 PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is dual: 1) to investigate which financial ratios are significant in the 
prediction of bank failure for the sample of Russian and Ukrainian banks for the first decade of 
this century; 2) to see if there are any similar factors, which drive the bank to bankruptcy in both 
countries. As an instrument for our analysis we employ the linear probability and the binary 
choice models. They are used to analyze the significance of different financial ratios drawn from 
the publicly available annual balance sheets for the period 2002-20087. The choice of the 
examined financial ratios is limited to the extent of availability of the data. Available data 
include the capital of the bank, total assets, deposits, loans and profit after tax.8  
1.4 LIMITATIONS 
The primary limitation of the study, which we cannot avoid, is the quality and transparency of 
both Russian and Ukrainian accounting data. Unfortunately, in ex-Soviet Union countries it is 
still possible that all financial statements and especially the data on profits are easily 
manipulated. And of course, if the initial data is drawn from sources which do not reflect the true 
economic reality, then the estimations and conclusions based on this data are questionable. 
Also despite many similarities, we realize the difference that exists between the economic and 
political conditions in each of the two banking systems. Future research should try to account for 
the regional differences and macroeconomic environment. 
                                                             7 The sample period differs for Ukraine and Russia; the details are described in Section 4.1. 8 The details on selection of variables are presented in Section 4.2. 
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1.5 OUTLINE OF THE PAPER 
Section 1 introduces the reader to the background of the problem raised in the essay. The 
specification of the problem, the purpose of the study and the limitations are stated. The current 
situation and the development dynamics of Ukrainian and Russian banking sectors are described 
in Section 2. A short review of the previous research in the field of bank failure prediction 
models, a description of the theory and method is presented in Section 3. In Section 4 a 
discussion of the estimation results and performance of the models are described. The 
conclusions are provided in Section 5. 
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2. A short description of the Ukrainian and Russian 
banking sectors 
To give the general idea about the objects of our analysis, in this section we present the current 
situation and the development dynamics of the two banking systems. 
 
The history of Russian and Ukrainian banking systems reflects the processes and tendencies that 
have taken the place throughout the countries evolution. These two countries are closely related 
in many spheres and in the banking sector as well. Both are a two-tier system and consist of the 
central bank and commercial banks of various types and forms of ownership. Until 1991 Ukraine 
and Russia had a unified economic and financial system, but after the Soviet Union broke up a 
new spiral in the development of both banking sectors arose. According to the information from 
the annual reports of Russian and Ukrainian central banks,9 the both banking sectors demonstrate 
a high rate of growth during recent times. Some of growth rates are presented in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 Some Rates of Growth of Banking Sectors in Ukraine and Russia  
 
Thus, the growth is especially significant in Ukraine, where the banking system developed 
rapidly despite the political and economic problems at the end of 2004 and the slowdown of the 
economic processes thereafter.  Since 2001 the banking assets increased almost by 50% in 
nominal terms. “In 2007, the Ukrainian banking system gained a record high profit in the history 
of the domestic banking system, which is 1.6 times higher than in 2006 and 12 times higher than 
the profit gained in the year 2001. As of 01.01.2008, return on assets (ROA) was 1.5 %, return 
on equity (ROE) - 12.67%.” 11 By 01.01.2008 the total number of operating banks was 175 in 
Ukraine and more than one thousand in Russia. Among them there are 47 and 202 banks with 
participation of the foreign capital for two countries respectively. Credit institutions in both 
countries were characterized by the growth in loans to nonfinancial enterprises and households.  
                                                             9 The information is taken as of 01.01.08. 
10 Grows rates are taken for 2007 compared to 2006. 
11 http://www.bank.gov.ua   
Parameters10 Ukrainian banking sector Russian banking sector 
Annual bank capital grows %  76.0 57.8 
Capital to GDP ratio, % 10.0 8.1 
Annual assets grows, % 76.0 44.1 
Profit grows, % 160.0 36.7 
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Unfortunately from the second part of 2008 the situation in the banking sectors of both countries 
has changed. Thus, for the first four months of 2009, 13 Ukrainian banks were taken under the 
temporary administration of National Bank of Ukraine because of their insolvency. The total 
expenses of banks for the first quarter of 2009 exceeds the incomes almost on 10 % (in 
comparison, for the same period in 2008 the income were greater than expenses on 13%).  There 
are still not any publications about the defaults of Russian banks this year. However the Moody’s 
Global Credit Research 2008 presents the following information: “Moody`s outlook for the 
Russian banking system is negative, reflecting our concerns with regard to the system’s 
structural weaknesses which have become particularly apparent in the course of the crisis in the 
Russian stock market - and the possible impact of negative external factors. Thanks to their focus 
on the domestic market in terms of assets, the global credit and liquidity crisis has not resulted in 
any direct losses for the Russian banks. However, in terms of their liabilities, the impact of the 
crisis has been more significant, with reduced access to market funding a major driver of a 
slowdown in growth.” 12  
  
                                                             12 Moody's Global Credit Research, 2008 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
3.1 REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
In this sub-section we give a short overview of previous research which has been done in the 
field of domestic and cross-country bank-failure prediction models.  
 
The article which became a starting point of our essay is an article on a cross-country bank 
failure prediction model for Japan and Indonesia by Montgomery, Santoso et al. (2005). They 
use a logistic model (though they do not specify if they use a panel or a pooled logit) and a 
stepwise logistic model on 17 financial ratios for the entire population of banks in Indonesia in 
1997-2003 and Japanese banks for period from 1978 to 2001. The authors construct two 
domestic and cross-country models and then compare their properties. Their domestic models 
show the importance of monitoring the portfolio of banks loans for prediction of bank failures. In 
both Japan and Indonesia they find such ratios as loans to deposits and loans to total assets 
statistically significant, in contrast with regulatory capital ratios, which are found not to be 
important predictors of bank failure for the period of the study. But the most important fact they 
present is that their cross-country model out-performs the domestic models in predictive power. 
This, in their words, can stimulate the regional cooperation on this issue.   
 
A similar idea of identifying the factors, which influence banking crises in developed and 
developing countries is used by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, p.81). But in contrast to 
the previously presented article they analyze the macro-factors as the determinants of the 
banking crises for the range of countries from the list of International Monetary Fund for period 
1980-1994. They use a pooled logit model in their study. And they find that “crises tend to erupt 
when the macroeconomic environment is weak, particularly when growth is low and inflation is 
high” as well as high real interest rate also indicates the problems in the banking sector. One 
more research on determinants of the financial crisis on the macro-level is made by Komulainen 
and Lukkarila (2003). These authors use a panel probit on aggregated data. Using 23 
macroeconomic indicators as explanatory variables for several emerging market’s countries for 
the period 1980-2001, they conclude that such variables as unemployment, inflation and several 
indicators of indebtedness can help in explaining the currency crises. But this paper, as well as 
the two others mentioned above, does not concentrate on the econometric part of research and 
some details are not clear. In particular, researchers do not mention anything about possible 
problem of model misspecification. 
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However, among the literature on bank failure prediction models in the Russian case there are a 
number of articles, which implement a very thorough analysis as well as explain the ideas very 
clearly. For instance, Peresetsky et al. (2004) use binary choice models for the analysis of 
different ratios drawn from financial statements of the banks and also some macroeconomic 
variables. Firstly, the authors analyze the significance of 30 bank parameters using a pooled logit 
based on accounting data for 1569 Russian banks for a two-year period of crisis in Russia. Then 
they take quarterly balance sheet data for a five-year period, include macro-indicators and 
implement an analysis using a random effect probit on panel data. They also show that clustering 
(or grouping the banks by size or other characteristics) helps to improve the predictive power of 
pooled logit. Macroeconomic variables are shown to improve the model’s performance. One 
more paper on failure prediction of Russian banks is written by Konstandina (2006). She uses a 
multivariate panel logit (but also does not indicate if it is random or fixed effect) and 
proportional-hazard models for two panels of Russian banks (annual and quarterly basis). Both 
models attempt to capture the effect of micro and macro factors on bank failure. In contrast with 
Peresetsky et al. (2004) this study does not confirm the significance of macroeconomic variables.  
 
As to the research on bank failure prediction models for Ukrainian case, we have not found so 
many empirical studies. This is probably connected with the fact that not so much research in 
this field exists and even less is available online. We can mention only two Master theses of 
students at the Economic Education and Research Consortium in Kiev, who analyzed this 
question. Popryga (2001) use a limited dependent variable model for analyzing the financial 
ratios of 111 Ukrainian banks for the period from 1995 to 1996. Her main result is that some 
traditional variables (such as return on equity) are not significant for soundness of Ukrainian 
banks. Location of the bank and the duration of its business do not play a role in this issue. One 
more similar study is made by Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2003). He performs various methods of 
analysis of bank failures during 1998-2003. He finds that one of the major factors which have the 
influence on bankruptcy of banks is their size. 
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3.2 THEORY 
Below we present and compare the theories and models, which are designed to analyze the 
default risk of companies. The motivation for why we choose the analysis of financial ratios as a 
basic tool for our study is also described in this section. 
According to Crosbie and Bohn (2005), default risk is the uncertainty surrounding a firm's ability 
to service its debts and obligations.  A plethora of approaches is developed to model this event 
and to control it. In Table 3.1 a short description of four popular methods of assessment of the 
default probability is presented. All of them are used for the credit-risk management inside 
banks, but they are also applicable to valuation of commercial banks. The table is based on 
theories presented in the book of Saunders and Allen (2002) “Credit Risk Measurement.” Table 
3.1 illustrates that taking into consideration the necessary initial data, simplicity and 
transparency of the analysis; we find the credit scoring system is the most appropriate for our 
analysis. However, as we do not score any credits here, but rather evaluate the significance of 
different financial ratios in prediction of the bank failure, hereafter we will call this approach a 
financial ratio analysis. According to Saunders and Allen (2002, p.20), the idea behind this 
method is “to pre-identify certain key factors that determine the probability of default and 
combine or weight them into a quantitative score”. One of the first analyses of financial ratios for 
predicting the bankruptcy of companies is an Altman Z-score model. Altman (1968) use a 
multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to analyze a set of financial ratios for a grouped data set 
of failed and surviving firms. In his paper the discriminant function has the following form:  
(3.1)                                         Z = v1x1 + v2 x2 +. . . + vnxn                                         
 Where v1, v2, ... vn are  discriminant coefficients and x1, x2, . . . xn are independent variables, 
representing different financial ratios. According to Altamn (1968, p.592) this function 
“transforms individual variable values to a single discriminant score or Z value which is then 
used to classify the object” as default or non-default. 
  
13  
Table 3.1 The Comparative Analysis of Theories on Default Probability  
Approach  Short Description Advantages Shortcomings 
Could it be used 
in our study? 
External 
Rating   
Systems 
International credit rating 
agencies rate the 
creditworthiness and quality of 
the different institutions. 
Assumed to be 
independent; 
recognized all 
over the world. 
As the ratings are 
made on a payment 
base, their 
objectivity is 
questionable; rate’s 
updates are often not 
appropriate. 
No. Only few 
banks in Russia 
and Ukraine are 
rated. 
Artificial 
Neural  
Networks 
Simulates the human learning 
process. Based on analysis of 
input and output variables that 
can give the probability of 
default. 
Does not 
depend on 
human factors, 
able to make 
educated 
"guess" when 
the information 
is incomplete. 
Does not give 
transparent 
information about 
final output,  
and relative 
importance of input 
variables. 
Possibly, but 
knowledge of 
sophisticated 
statistical 
techniques is 
required. 
Credit 
scoring  
systems 
Credit score are calculated 
based on certain input factors 
and their weights. 
 
Simple, 
transparent, 
easy to 
implement 
even with a 
limited data 
set. 
The linear form of 
underlying model 
does not describe 
the real relationship; 
 cannot catch the 
negative dynamics 
of a quickly 
deteriorating 
company. 
Yes. We have 
necessary input 
information and 
we are familiar 
with the 
techniques used 
for this analysis. 
Contingent 
Claim 
Models 
Calculate the probability of 
default (PD) for a particular 
firm within a certain period of 
time. The market value of 
assets and equity connected to 
each other through Merton's 
option pricing model. 
In addition to 
PD the 
recovery 
 rate can be 
calculated, 
application 
of stock prices 
allows catching  
the changes in 
financial 
conditions 
 of the 
company.   
Only those 
companies that are 
publicly traded 
can be analyzed. 
No. We do not 
have enough 
initial 
information. As 
only few banks 
in Russia and 
Ukraine are 
quoted on the 
stock market. 
 
From the set of 22 potential explanatory variables Altman constructs the following function of 
five financial ratios that are weighted by the estimated coefficients: 
(3.2)                                 Z=1.2x1+1.4x2+3.3x3+0.6x4+1.0x5                                                                                          
where X1 = working capital/total assets ratio; 
           X2 = retained earnings/total assets ratio; 
           X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets ratio; 
           X4 = market value of equity/book value of total liabilities ratio; 
           X5 = sales/total assets ratio. 
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If the value of the z-score is below the critical value (originally in Altman’s study it is equal to 
1.81), then the firm is classified as bankrupt. A number of criticisms about Altman’s Z-score are 
raised in the economic literature, among them Gharghori et al. (2006, p.208) emphasize two 
problems with accounting-based measures of default. The first is that financial statements report 
a firm’s performance for the past period, which is inconsistent with a “forward-looking measure 
of default risk”. And the second problem is that we can only guess intuitively which ratios 
should be used in predicting the default since no precise theory exists.  
Nevertheless we decided to use this model as a basic for our study because despite the existence 
of more sophisticated techniques, the financial ratio analysis is still one of the simplest, most 
understandable and transparent. Moreover, it is widely applicable in the modern regulatory 
policy of central banks; hence the conclusions and suggestions made in our essay can be more 
appropriate for the specialists of these organizations than conclusions based on other unfamiliar 
to them techniques. For instance, Halling et al. (2006) describe that the regulatory function of 
many central banks is realized through on-site and off-site inspection of commercial banks. As 
on-site inspection is usually very costly and takes a considerable amount of time, the decision of 
performing it for a particular bank is based on the analysis of information, available to 
supervisors. The Russian and Ukrainian central banks use balance sheets and income statements 
for the evaluation of financial stability of commercial banks.  In calculations of the ratios drawn 
from the financial statements, they use either their own methodology or methodology developed 
by the Bank of International Settlements, and the International Monetary Fund. According to the 
information posted on the web-pages of the central banks of analyzed countries, all indicators of 
financial stability of commercial banks can be placed in one of several groups: the indicators of 
the adequacy of a capital, the indicators of profitability, liquidity indicators, and indicators of the 
bank’s assets structure. Aziz et al. (2006, p.23) have also given the empirical evidence for the 
argument that the financial ratios analysis still remains the most popular technique.  They 
examine 46 articles, which report 89 empirical studies of corporate bankruptcy prediction. They 
find that ”more than 60 per cent of the studies used financial ratios as the only explanatory 
variables, about 7 per cent used cash flow information while the remaining 33 per cent employed 
a mix of financial ratios and other variables (including macroeconomic, industry-specific, 
location, and other firm-specific variables)”.  
However, different methods can be employed for evaluation the financial ratios of interest. The 
descriptions of the methods, which can be used in this type of analysis, are presented in the next 
sub-section. 
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3.3 METHOD 
3.3.1 SELECTION OF THE APPROPRIATE MODEL 
The following three methodological forms are the most commonly used for the analysis of 
financial ratios: (1) binary choice models (probit and logit) (2) multiple discriminant analysis, (3) 
proportional hazard models. Returning to the statistics reported by Aziz et al (2006) we can say 
that more than 30 per cent of the research examined by them use multiple discriminant analysis, 
while another 21 per cent prefer the logit model. A total of 77 per cent of all studies on corporate 
bankruptcy prediction use statistical models. The ranking of relative performance of statistical 
models suggests that MDA and logit models can be more reliable than other statistical, 
artificially intelligent expert system (AIES) and the theoretical models. 
Different authors criticize or defend the properties of the statistical models mentioned above. For 
instance, Whalen (1991) emphasizes that such models as discriminant analysis, logit and probit 
are designed only to model the probability that a bank with a given set of characteristics will be 
ranked as default or non-default. However, these models cannot predict the time, when the event 
will happen. In contrast to them the proportional hazard model allows one to estimate the time to 
failure, moreover it does not make any assumptions about the distributional properties of the 
data, which can be easily violated. Nevertheless, existing research gives different empirical 
evidence concerning the benefits of binary choice and time survival models. For example, 
Laviola et al. (1999) in their study of fragility of Italian banks conclude that the proportional 
hazard model outperforms logit and probit, though Lee and Urrutia (1996) find that logit and 
hazard models differ in number of significant coefficients and their use should be combined. The 
choice between binary choice models and MDA is not clearly identified among the researches. 
Thus, Canbas et al. (2005) use both types of these models in the prediction of banks failures for 
the Turkish case and find that in some instances, MDA can give a more accurate prediction than 
logit or probit. The study of Kim et al (2006), however, illustrates that logit has better 
performance than discriminant analysis. 
 
The statistics presented above are based on articles, which predict the corporate bankruptcy for 
different type of companies. However, if we consider bank failure prediction models in 
particular, to our knowledge, binary choice models still remain the most popular for modeling 
the defaults of banks. Consequently in this essay we mostly focus our attention on binary 
response models (the linear probability model is also implemented, the motivation is discussed 
below).  
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3.3.2 BINARY CHOICE AND LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS  
 
First of all we need to clarify that in bank failure prediction models the outcome is default or no 
default, in other words the dependent variable y takes the value 0 (no default) or 1 (default). We 
want to explain this event with the help of several explanatory variables x. Using matrix notation, 
a general model can be written as: 
(3.3) P(yi =1│xi) = F(xiʹβ)            
 
Where 0 ≤ F≤ 1, means that F is a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.). As we only have 
information on zeros and ones on the left-hand side of equation there has to be a large number of 
observations to estimate the function F .The simple linear regression is not the best choice here 
and the simplest motivation for this is that in linear regression models the estimated value of y is 
not restricted to be in the interval between 0 and 1. However, Wooldridge (2002) asserts that 
despite the weaknesses of linear probability models (LPM) for binary response they often can 
give good estimates of the partial effect on response probability. Thus if we set F(xiʹβ)= xiʹβ, 
LPM for binary response y is specified as:     
(3.4)                                                     P (y = 1|xi) = xiʹβ +εi         
with E(ε|x ) = 0 and Var(ε|x) = xiʹβ(1- xiʹβ). 
 
According to Verbeek (2008, p.200), to overcome the problems of LPM, the binary choice 
models (or binary response, latent variable models) are used. They are “designed to model the 
“choice” between two discrete alternatives” (e.g. default/no default, married/unmarried etc). 
Most commonly in these models the cumulative normal function and the logistic function are the 
specified for F in expression (3.3). The difference between these two functions is marginal (both 
have an expectation of zero, but the variance of the logistic distribution is equal to π2/3) and in 
most of the cases both give almost the same results for marginal effect and for the sign of 
parameters. If we choose the standard normal distribution as a function for F: 
(3.5)                                                   ( ) =  ∫  √         −                  
this leads to the probit model, while the standard logistic distribution, given by  
(3.6)                                                                            ( ) =         ,                                                                
leads to the logit model. 
Apart from the signs, the coefficients in binary choice models cannot be interpreted directly. 
Knowing the sign of the estimated coefficient we can judge if the effect of particular variable has 
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positive or negative effect, but to find its magnitude, the marginal effect of changes in the 
explanatory variables should be calculated.  The marginal effect Ψj of the i-th regressor is: 
(3.7)                                                      (  ) =   ( |   )     = βj f(xiʹβ)           
Where f (s) = ∂F(s)/ ∂s is the p.d.f. Empirically, the marginal effect for the average observation is 
usually calculated. For our further discussion it is also important to underline that in binary 
choice models the ordinary residuals eoi do not have the same meaning as in the linear regression. 
Instead the generalized residuals egi play an important role. The usefulness of generalized 
residuals derives from the fact that by multiplying them by each of the regressors, the score 
vector is obtained. This score vector then can be used in Lagrange Multiplier tests (the details of 
the tests used in this study are described in Section 3.3.5). The generalized residuals are derived 
from the first order condition of the maximum-likelihood estimates13 and they may be regarded 
as orthogonal to regressors. In the Table 3.2 three types of residuals are summarized and  ̂ = 1 −   −  ʹ    there, is the fitted probability, esi is standardized residuals (fitted probability 
divided by theoretical standard deviation), which also will be used in the next chapters. The 
expressions in the table are taken from Eviews manual. 
                                                                                             
Table 3.2 Three Types of Residuals Mentioned in our Study 
Ordinary    =    −   ̂  
Standardized 
    =   −   ̂   ̂ (1−  ̂ ) 
Generalized 
    =  (  −  ̂ ) (−  ʹ  ) ̂ (1−  ̂ )  
 
 
3.3.3 PANEL AND POOLED DATA REPRESENTATION 
To make the further discussion clear, in the Figure 3.1 we illustrate the simplified scheme of our 
research.  The terminology is described below.                                                                                       
 
 
                                                             13 The maximum likelihood method is most commonly used for the estimation of the parameters in binary choice models. Our estimation will be implemented with the help of two programs: Eviews and Stata, both of them allow using this method. 
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Figure 3.1 The Simplified Scheme of Empirical Analysis 
 
 
   
 
 
 
It is very important to define what we mean by pooled and panel data in this essay. According to 
Wooldridge (2002 p.128-129) the idea behind the pooling cross section over time is “that during 
each year a new random sample is taken from the relevant population. Since distributions of 
variables tend to change over time, the identical distribution assumption is not usually valid, but 
the independence assumption is. ” He also states that in using pooled data it is useful to include 
the time dummies and even interact them with some explanatory variables to “allow the partial 
effect to change over time”. In the panel data the same groups of cross-sectional units are 
followed over time, what allows to control for individual cross-sectional heterogeneity.  
 
In our case we have the observations on 943 Russian banks for the period of six years and on 186 
Ukrainian banks for period of seven years. In the Table 3.3 we present the classification of linear 
probability model used for in our estimation. The indices here have the following interpretation:  
j = Ukraine, Russia; i = 1,…, Nj (number of banks); t = 1,…, Tj (number of years). For the logit 
and probit the classification is the same. 
Table 3.3 Classification of linear probability model 
 Domestic Cross-Country 
Pooled     =   +     ʹ        =  +     ʹ   
Panel     =    +     ʹ        =    +     ʹ   
 
The motivation behind such classification is that, first of all, the outcomes of the binary choice 
models are very sensitive to the variation in the dependant variable y.  And as the bankruptcy of 
the bank is not a very frequent event, the number of zeroes (no default) significantly dominates 
the number of ones (default), we need to try different techniques to get the output. For instance, 
initially we only had about 2% of defaults in our sample and then the pooled probit for Ukraine 
did not give any results (unless the constant term was excluded from the regression) before we 
added to the initial sample the information for the year 2008 and the number of defaulted banks 
•OLS Regression
•Probit
Pooled 
Data
•OLS Regression
•Random Effect ProbitPanel Data
Ukraine 
Russia 
Cross-Country 
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increased almost twice for Ukrainian case14. One more way to overcome the problem of small 
variation in the dependent variable is the use the random effects (RE) probit for the panel data. 
The further discussion on panel data is presented below 
 
3.3.4 FIXED AND RANDOM EFFECTS FOR PANEL DATA  
As it was shortly mentioned above, the panel data are two-dimensional (even though, it can have 
a more complicated structure), and contains the time series observations for a number of cross-
sectional units. Hsiao (2005) distinguishes between different advantages of the panel data. 
Among others he emphasizes that panel data usually gives more accurate and effective 
predictions because of a greater number of degrees of freedom and less multicollinearity 
comparing with cross-sectional data. He also questions the accuracy of estimations if the data is 
pooled rather than taking into account the data for each individual. He reckons that if data are 
conditional on the same variables, panel data allow taking into account individual heterogeneity 
by observing the behaviors of other individuals. Hence, this gives more precise information on 
individual behavior in comparison with another one. 
 
According to Verbeek (2008) in the estimation of linear or nonlinear models using panel data, a 
fixed or random effects specification has to be chosen. To explain the difference among them, 
we present here the binary choice model in terms of an underlying latent variable yit* (this 
variable represents the unobserved characteristics, which influence the outcome of qualitative 
variable):  
(3.8)                                                           yit* = xitʹ β + αi + uit                                         
where yit =1 if yit*>0 and yit = 0 otherwise. The error term uit has a symmetric distribution 
function F(.), var (uit) = σu2, Cov(uit, ujs) = 0, ∀ i ≠ j or t ≠ s. The term αi is the so called the 
individual heterogeneity. We can assume it to be a fixed parameter, which should be estimated 
or we consider it as a random error term, accordingly we have then the fixed effects or random 
effects specification of the model. 
 
Greene (2004) emphasizes practical and methodological shortcomings of the non-linear fixed 
effects model. The first is the difficulty of computing the maximum likelihood estimation for 
probably thousands of dummies and the second is the “incidental parameter” problem, which 
brings into question the statistical properties of ML estimator. He argues that this estimator is 
inconsistent when T, the number of time period is fixed. Verbeek (2008, p.396) underlines that in 
                                                             14 Due to the financial crisis for the first four months of year 2009 13 Ukrainian banks were placed under the temporary administration of National Bank because of their insolvency and was indicated as default in year 2008 in our data set. 
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the fixed effects binary choice model, “only individuals who changed the status at least once are 
relevant for estimating β”. Others are simply excluded from the estimation as they do not 
provide any information about β. Since the banks in our case have very few defaults, they do not 
change their status very often, and thus using random effects specification seems more 
reasonable. At the same time, we have to be aware that the random effects probit assumes the 
independence of individual effects (the αi) of the regressors (the xi). But the correlation between 
these two terms often exists in practice and this can lead to inconsistent estimators. Besides the 
choice between the random or fixed effects, we have to distinguish if we use logit or probit in 
our analysis. The common approach for the panel data is to use the multivariate normal 
distribution, which leads to a random effects probit model. The motivation behind this is that we 
assume the normal distribution for both αi and uit. It is, of course possible to assume the logistic 
distribution for one or both of the terms, but then the sum of this distributions could lead to 
estimation of probabilities, which does not correspond to probit or logit model.  
 
Consequently, in our paper we use the random effects probit model for the analysis of the panel 
data. We also implement the standard probit estimation for pooled data and, despite its 
shortcomings the linear probability model is used. According to Maddala (1987), if we ignore 
the correlation among the error terms, the linear regression can give consistent (but not efficient) 
estimates.  
 
3.3.5. SPECIFICATION TESTS IN THE MODELS 
For specification tests in the models, we found it important to implement the heteroskedasticity 
and the normality tests. As it was mentioned in Section 3.3.3, we can suspect the presence of 
heteroskedasticity when we are pooling the cross-sectional data over time. Moreover the 
presence of nonnormality and heteroskedasticity can make the estimation of binary choice 
models biased. Below we describe consequently the effect of heteroskedasticity and 
nonnormality on linear and nonlinear models as well as testing strategies.  
 
In the linear regression model one of the assumptions, which has to be made to produce the 
efficient estimates of the coefficients, is the assumption of homoskedasticity or constant variance 
of conditional distribution of the error terms ε given the matrix of explanatory variables x: 
(3.9)                                                   Var(ε|x) = Var(ε) = σ2I         
where I is identity matrix (diagonal matrix with diagonal elements equal to one). 
But if the variance of the error term varies over observations and does not equal to expression 
3.9, then this problem is referred to heteroskedasticity. As a consequence the OLS estimates are 
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not efficient, but still unbiased and consistent. 15 To overcome this problem in the linear 
regression model, modern econometric theory proposes either using an alternative estimator, 
reconsidering the model specification or adjusting the standard errors of the OLS estimator for 
heteroskedasticity.  
 As to normality, for exact statistical inference the assumption about the distribution of the error 
terms has to be made. Most commonly, the error terms are assumed to be jointly normally 
distributed. If this restriction is violated, interpretation of the results could not be correct. 
In the case of binary choice models the heteroskedasticity and nonnormality have other 
consequences. According to Wooldridge (2002, p.479), if we remember that in latent variable 
model we focus on P(y = 1|x), then heteroskedasticity in Var (ε|x) “entirely change the 
functional form for P(y = 1|x) = E (y|x) and “it makes little sense to care about consistent 
estimation for β when P(y = 1|x) ≠ F(xiʹβ). Nonnormality in the error term in probit model 
means that F(w) ≠ Φ(w), where Φ(w) is the standard normal density and P(y = 1|x) ≠ Φ(xiʹβ). 
Hence, both of these problems mean that the distribution assumed for binary choice model is not 
correct and it leads to inconsistent estimator.         
 
Taking into consideration the different consequences for linear and binary choice models and 
probit in particular, the testing strategies are also quite different. We summarized the tests, which 
are used in this essay in Table 3.4. However, one more important thing we need to mention is 
that the discussion above covered only for the case with pooled data. In a random effects panel 
data model the things are becoming more complicated. According to Verbeek (2008, p.373), 
“most of the tests that can be used for heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation in the random effects 
model are computationally burdensome”. Moreover, as it is presented in Appendix 5, the tests 
for both linear and nonlinear models in the pooled set of data (except the probit for Ukraine) 
reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. Normality is rejected in all cases except the probit 
for the set of Russian banks and weakly for the Ukrainian pooled probit. That is why we assume 
that in the random effects probit model we have heteroskedasticity (except the case for Ukraine) 
and nonnormality (except the case for Russia) as well. 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                             15 For the proof see, for example, Section 4.1 in Verbeek (2008). 
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Table 3.4 Tests for Normality and Heteroskedasticity used in the Study 16 
The Test 
The Null 
Hypothesis The Testing Procedure 
Test  
Statistic 
Linear Model 
  
Normality 
Test 
Skewness:   
E (εi3)=0,  
Kurtosis:     
E (εi4-σ4)=0 
under the 
normal 
distribution 
Check: 
 If E (εi3) ≠ 0, the distribution of εi is not symmetric around zero 
 If E (εi4-3σ4) > 0, the distribution displays excess kurtosis 
Breusch-
Pagan  
Heteroskedas
ticity Test 17 
H0: σi2=σ2  
H1: 
σi2=h(ziʹα) 
1) Assume simple linear regression: 
             yi  = α + βx iʹ+εi 
2) Regress y on explanatory variables x and get 
the residuals ε;     
                                                                   
3) Regress ε2 on a constant and z; 
 
4) Test if coefficients of z are equal to 0. 
1) Usual F-test 
2) n*R 2  from 
regression (3) is 
asymptotically 
χ2 under H0 with 
df  equal to the 
number of 
variables in z 
  
  
Binary choice model 
  
 Normality 
Test 
(Lagrange 
Multiplier 
(LM) 
framework)18 
 H0:  
 γ1 = γ2 = 0 
 
1) Assume the restricted distribution function, 
which allows for skewness (γ1≠ 0) and excess 
kurtosis (γ2≠ 0), then probit is described as 
following:                                           
P(y = 1|x) = Φ (xiʹβ+ γ1(xiʹβ)2+ γ2((xiʹβ)3)    
              
2)Run the auxiliary regression of vector of ones 
upon19 egi xiʹ, egi (xiʹβ)2, egi (xiʹβ)3 
 1) Usual F-test 
2) n*R 2  from 
regression (2) is 
asymptotically 
χ2 under H0 with 
two degrees of 
freedom (df) 
 Heteroskeda
sticity 
(Lagrange 
Multiplier 
(LM) 
framework) 
 H0: σi2=σ2 
 H1:   
σi2=h(ziʹα)) 
1)Run the probit on explanatory variables, 
retrieve the fitted probabilities  ̂ and fitted index 
function xiʹ   
2) Run the following auxiliary regression with 
standardized residuals20 εsi on the left-hand-side 
   =   (−  ʹ  )  ̂ (1 −  ̂ )   ʹ   +   −  ʹ   (−  ʹ  )  ̂ (1 −  ̂ )   ʹ  +    
 
 The explained 
sum of squares 
from regression 
in (2) is 
asymptotically 
χ2 under H0 with 
df  equal to the 
number of 
variables in z 
                                                             16  In this table the methodology described in Verbeek (2008), Wooldridge (2002) and Eviews manual is used. 17  In this table n denotes the number of observations; z is a vector of exogenous variables. 18 LM tests are used when unrestricted model is difficult to estimate. Thus we estimate only restricted model and see if the restrictions, which were made, violate the hypothesis about unrestricted model. 19 egi stated for generalized residuals here, which described in Section 3.3.2 20 The formula for standardized residuals is presented in Section 3.3.2 
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4. Empirical Study 
4.1 DATA COLLECTION 
In our study we use the financial ratios, which are drawn from the publicly available financial 
statements of Russian and Ukrainian banks. The data are taken on the annual basis from 
01.01.2003 to 01.01.2008 for Russia and from 01.01.2003 to 01.01.2009 for Ukraine. This 
period is chosen because the best data set is available for it. Also it is important to take the data 
for 2008 for Ukraine because it allows us to increase the variation in the dependent variable. As 
it was mentioned before, for the first four months of the year 2009, 13 Ukrainian banks were 
placed under the temporary administration of National Bank due to their insolvency and they are 
indicated as default in year 2008 in our data set. The annual balances for Russian banks for the 
year 2008 are still not available for a moment. 
 
 Our sample includes the accounting data on 943 Russian credit institutions, which are available 
on the web-page of the central bank of Russia and 186 Ukrainian banks, which were in business 
in the period 2002-2008. The total number of observations comes up to seven thousand for two 
countries. The banks are classified as failed if their licenses are withdrawn or the banks are under 
the temporary administration of National Bank of Ukraine or Agency for Restructuring the 
Credit Organizations in Russia. 
  
 As the sources of our data we used the web-pages of Ukrainian and Russian central banks. And 
we need to mention here, that these web-pages are not designed to get the necessary information 
easily. That is why the data collecting took the major of time, which was given for writing this 
paper. The information, which posted on Ukrainian web-page, is presented in aggregated tables 
for all the banks. On the one hand, it is easy-to-use, but on the other hand it took us very long 
time to discover if a specific bank was failed, merged or just renamed if it disappears from the 
table in the forthcoming period. Such information is not available on the web-page of National 
Bank of Ukraine, so we had to search for it in different sources on the web. Moreover, the 
information in aggregated tables does not allow us to use all desirable variables, which are 
available in the balance sheets of Russian Banks, for instance. The web-page of Russian central 
bank is much better organized than Ukrainian and gives the separate balance sheet for each of 
the bank. But due to the fact that we were drawing 10 parameters from each of the balance sheet 
for more than 900 banks for 6 years, it was very time-consuming and finally the special 
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computer programme was written by specialist to optimize the process of data collecting for 
Russian banks. 
 
4.2 SELECTION OF VARIABLES  
The dependant variable y is constructed in the following way: it is equal to zero if the bank is 
non-failed and it is equal to 1 if the bank is failed. To each value 1 of the bank, failed at time t 
corresponds its financial ratios at time t-1. 
 
Traditionally, in the financial ratios analysis the ratios of profitability, liquidity, and solvency are 
used. Unfortunately, in our study we have to skip the liquidity ratios because of the lack of 
appropriate indicators for Ukrainian banks and necessity to keep the equality in model for two 
countries estimated together. In our choice of explanatory variables we follow the previous 
research at this field. Montgomery, Santoso et al.(2005) take 17 ratios for their analysis, 
Peresetsky et al. (2004) use about 30 parameters in different models. But as we are limited by 
our initial data and also we are aware of the problem of multicollinearity (the sum of all possible 
parameters can come to one). “In general the term multicollinearity is used to describe the 
problem when an approximate linear relationship among the explanatory variables leads to 
unreliable regression estimates.” (Verbeek, p.43). Tucker (1996) emphasizes that this problem is 
typical when the financial data are modeled because all the variables are drawn from the same 
balance sheet or income statement. To minimize the presence of this problem we include in our 
study only those coefficients, which we find interesting for the analysis. Initially we took ten 
financial ratios, but then excluded two of them because of high correlation with other variables. 
Furthermore, in addition to the financial ratios we planned to include the macro-indicators in our 
study. But we were confronted by a problem of perfect correlation between the variables, 
because the macro-indicators are the same for each bank for a particular year.  
 
In table 4.1 the list of variables included in the model as well as their expected signs are 
presented. 
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Table 4.1 Variables Included in Estimation21  
 No Variable Description Expected sign 
1 CTD Capital/Deposits - 
2 CTA Capital/TotalAssets - 
3 LTA Loans/Total Assets + 
4 LTD Loans/Deposits + 
5 ROA Return/Total assets - 
6 ROC Return /Capital - 
7 DTA Deposits/Total assets - 
8 Size Natural logarithm of total assets - 
 
We expect capital to deposits and capital to total assets ratios to have the negative influence on 
probability of default because better capitalized banks have more reserves to cover their loan 
losses and meet obligations in case of bankruptcy. We assume the ratios loans to total assets and 
loans to deposits have the positive sign. The first ratio measures the credit risk and the second 
shows how much the bank depends on borrowed funds. We expect the ratios which measure the 
profitability (return on assets and return on capital) to have the negative sign because the high 
profitability usually indicates good performance and management of the bank. As Konstandina 
(2006, p.11) emphasizes “some aggressive and risky banks also could be profitable a few period 
before the failure”. But as it was mentioned before, the policy of tax minimization (and profit-
minimization correspondingly) is typical for ex-Soviet Union companies, that is why the 
expression above is not valid in our case. The deposits to assets ratio indicates the level of 
investors trust in the bank. The proxy for the bank size is taken as the natural logarithm of the 
total assets. It is not clear in which direction it influences the probability of default, but similar to 
other studies we assume a negative sign. 
 
The relative means of the chosen coefficients, grouped by failed and reliable banks, are 
presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. A visual analysis of the figures does not allow indicating 
clearly the direction of the influence, which can be expected in each of the countries, moreover 
contradictory conclusions can be made if we compare the means for each of the groups between 
the countries. For instance, the mean value for the loans to deposits ratio for failed banks in 
Russia are higher than for surviving banks, but the situation in Ukraine is inverse. The same 
picture is indicated for return on capital variable. Moreover, the fact that in Ukraine the return on 
capital is higher for failed banks than for the surviving is quite surprising, because it measures 
                                                             21 The full list of variables used in econometric models, including dummies, is presented in Appendix 1 
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the profitability of the bank, and it should be lower if the bank is in poor condition. Though, this 
could be connected with the fact, that sometimes when the bank has big losses, its own capital 
can be reflected in the balance sheet as a negative value. Consequently, the ratio of two negative 
figures, gives the positive ratio and this could explain the illustrated difference in the means. 
Hence, in contrast to theoretical suggestions, we can expect this ratio to have the positive sign 
for the probability of default in Ukrainian banks, though return on assets could have a negative 
sign. According to Figure 4.2 we can guess that capital to deposits and loans to deposits ratios 
have a positive influence on probability of default in the Russian case. 
 
Figure 4.1 Relative Means for Failed and Reliable Banks (Ukraine) 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Relative Means for Failed and Reliable Banks (Russia) 
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4.3 DISCUSSION OF ESTIMATION RESULTS 
In this sub-section we discuss the estimation results and highlight the coefficients which are 
found to be statistically significant for the banks failures for a given sample of Russian, 
Ukrainian banks and the cross-country model. 
 
In the sample of Ukrainian banks (Appendix 2) for the most of the coefficients we get the 
meaningful signs in the pool, panel probit and with some exclusions in the linear regression as 
well. For instance, the capitalization (CTA) and profitability measures (ROA) influence a bank 
failure negatively, as well as the size of the bank, i. e. the more profitable and bigger the bank is 
- the smaller the probability of its insolvency. The sign of the measure of a bank’s dependency 
on borrowing funds (LTA) also corresponds to the theoretical expectation, though it is 
insignificant in all implemented models. Furthermore if we return to our discussion on relative 
means of variables presented in Figure 4.1, where we expect the return on capital ratio (ROC) to 
have a positive sign (as its mean value is greater for the group of failed banks in comparison with 
surviving institutions), we can see that actually in linear regression and panel probit it has a 
positive sign and it is not statistically significant in any of the three presented models. Thus, the 
quality of initial data is crucial for the output of the estimation. Moreover, we have to be careful 
with inferences of the results as they could be biased because of heterokedasticity and non-
normality in pooled models, and in addition for the panel probit the estimation results can be 
biased because of an unbalanced panel.22 In Appendix 5 we present the results of specification 
tests, which show that we do not have the evidence of homoskedasticity except for the pooled 
probit for the Ukrainian case. This is probably connected with the fact that the number of cross-
sectional units here is smallest in comparison with other samples. Moreover, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of normality at 1% significance level also.  Consequently, based on pooled 
probit, which seems to be correctly specified, we can conclude that for a given period in Ukraine 
such explanatory variables as the capital to total assets, return on assets ratios as well as the size 
are found to be statistically significant. And the sign of their coefficients is in line with 
theoretical.23  In the linear regression the error terms are heteroskedastic and not normally 
distributed for the models in all three samples (Appendixes 5, 6). Though, they are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity with Newey-West standard errors.  
                                                             
22 Several institutions in our sample were merged or appeared in business not in the beginning of the concerned period. For further discussion on unbalanced panel see Amemiya et al. (2001) 
23 We should mention that before we have included in Ukrainian sample the data for the year 2008, which made the variation in the dependent variable greater, all the coefficients in the pooled models were insignificant and only two significant coefficients were in the panel probit model (SIZE and ROA). By this fact we want to emphasize again how sensitive the outcome of binary choice models to the variation in the dependent variable.   
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For the sample of Russian banks (Appendix 3), we single out three coefficients, which are 
significant in the LPM, pooled and panel probit. These are the coefficients for capital to total 
assets ratio (CTA), return on assets (ROA) and loans to total assets (LTA). Though, only one of 
them, ROA, has the expected sign. Opposite to theoretical, the coefficient of capital to total 
assets ratio (CTA) has a positive sign, but it is in line with the results of Konstantidina (2006) for 
the sample of Russian banks for the period from 1999 to 2003. She supposes that this could 
mean that less capitalized banks may recognize their weaknesses and do not undertake risky 
operations, in contrast with banks with big capital, which are more confident and thus can 
actively work with subprime mortgages, for instance. The negative sign of loans to total assets 
(LTA) ratio can be explained probably by the fact that the banks with big loan portfolio are more 
profitable (as the loan is the one of the important income items for banks), which indicates the 
good performance of its business. However, in the case with the Russian data set the 
specification tests (Appendix 5) do not allow us to say that our nonlinear model is correctly 
specified. And even though the normality is not rejected for the pooled probit, error terms are 
still heteroskedastic and the estimates of the model are not likely to be close to the true 
parameters. 
 
The common result for the two countries according to the local models: is the influence of the 
profitability (ROA) on the bank failure prediction (it is significant and have the same direction of 
influence for the both countries) and the capital to total asset ratio (CTA) (it significant in both 
countries, but have the different direction of influence). 
 
In the cross-country model as the dependent variables we have the pooled variables of Ukrainian 
and Russian banks. To introduce the country effect we use the country dummy (CD)24, which has 
the value of 1 for Russia and 0 for Ukraine. To see if there are any similarities in forces driving 
the banks to default in two countries, we include in the model variables specified according to 
each country. In other words, we include explanatory variables multiplied by the country dummy 
(CD_CTD, CD_CTA etc). Unfortunately we can not specify a country-time dummy because the 
estimation failed due to the perfect collinearity between the variables, so they were removed 
from the equations25. According to the estimates presented in Appendix 4, those coefficients of 
                                                             24 Though, in the case of pooled model it is probably more precise to say that this variable indicates if the model is correct or not. 25 The solution which could help to overcome this problem (excluding from the estimation only the time dummy multiplied by county dummy for the year 2008, for which we do not have any data for Russia) was explored in the end of writing of this paper. The changes couldn’t be made due to the time limitations and has to be taken into account for the future research. 
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financial ratios, which are created by pooling the parameters of two countries in one series, are 
all insignificant (except the ROC, which is significant on 10% level in OLS regression). The 
country dummy is not significant in three statistical models, but we cannot argue that the country 
effect does not exist in cross-country model. Because some other coefficients of the variables, 
which are designed to capture the differences between the countries, in particular CD_CTA, 
CD_ROA, are significant in pooled, panel probit and linear regression. Therefore we perform the 
Wald test with the null hypothesis that all the country specific coefficients (CD, CD_CTA, 
CD_ROA, etc.) are equal to zero. The test results, presented in Appendix 7 (Table A7.1), allows 
us to reject the null hypothesis only on the 5 % significance level (for pooled and panel 
regression), but not on the 1%. This could mean that there are some similar factors, which drive 
the banks to bankruptcy; however, the significant difference between two countries exists. 
Moreover, the effect of the influence of the same financial ratios on the bank failure could be 
opposite for each of the country (as it was described for the two local models above). But 
nevertheless we want to aware the reader again, that this conclusion also has to be taken very 
carefully because the tests in Appendix 5 and 6 indicate that the model is misspecified for cross-
country data.  
 
However, there is only one effect about which impact we can be sure. It is the time effect. 
Almost all the time dummies are significant in domestic and cross-country models. In addition, 
we perform the Wald test with the null hypothesis that all the time dummy coefficients are equal 
to zero. The results of the test are presented in Appendix 7 (Table A7.2). According to the test 
results we can reject the null on 5 % significance level for all the statistical models and on 1% 
significance level for all models, except the OLS.  So, we can conclude that in almost all the 
cases yearly events have significant impact on the banks insolvency. Significance of the time 
dummies indicates that there are strong differences in failures in different periods. For example, 
in 2004-2005 in Ukraine there were very specific economic and political conditions which could 
have impact on banks` failure probability. According to the estimation results D2004 is 
significant in all types of them only for Ukraine. 
 
And even though, our results do not show that many of the coefficients are statistically 
significant, we need to compare the models in their predictive power and the results are 
presented in the next subsection. 
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4.4 MODEL COMPARISON 
To compare the predictive power of domestic models with the cross-country in this subsection 
we present the results of the in-sample and out-of- sample forecasts. 
 
4.4.3 IN-SAMPLE FORECAST 
As all three statistical models (LPM, pooled and panel OLS) show more or less similar results in 
terms of significance of the coefficients, we have chosen only pooled probit for testing the 
predictive power (in-sample as well as out-of-sample) 26. In Table 4.2 we present the evaluation 
of percentage of correct predictions of zeroes and ones for two domestic and cross-country 
models.  
Table 4.2 Expectation-Prediction Evaluation for Binary Specification 
Estimated equation 
 y=0 y=1 total y=0 y=1 total y=0 y=1 total 
 Russia Ukraine Cross-country 
P(y=1)≤ C 3532 46 3578 930 9 939 4460 47 4507 
P(y=1)>C 2367 79 2446 171 21 192 2385 92 2477 
Total 5899 125 6024 1101 30 1131 6845 139 6984 
Correct 3532 79 3611 930 21 951 4460 92 4552 
% Correct 59.87 63.20 59.94 84.47 70.00 84.08 65.16 66.19 65.18 
% Incorrect 40.13 36.80 40.06 15.53 30.00 15.92 34.84 33.81 34.82 
 
But to proceed with this type of evaluation, we need to choose the cut-off point. If the value of 
the estimated probability is less or equal to this point, the bank is classified as default, and non-
default in the opposite case. As it is suggested by Eviews manual, it is useful to take the value of 
this threshold equal to the percentage of ones in y.  In our case we take the success cut-off point 
for Ukraine equal to 0.04. For Russian and the cross-country models the threshold value is equal 
to 0.02. Consequently, based on the specified cut-off point, we can see that the pooled probit for 
the Russian sample correctly predicts 59.87% of the surviving and 63.2 % of failed banks. For 
the Ukrainian sample this model correctly predicts 84.47 % of reliable and 70 % failed banks. In 
the cross-country model the percentage is 65.16 % and 66.19% correspondingly. Thus, overall 
in-sample forecast indicates that the pooled probit correctly predicts 59.94% of the observations 
                                                             26 We also perform the forecast for the panel probit models but as far as we get worst results for the 2 from 3 models we decided not to include these calculations in discussion, but they can be given by request. The main results of in-sample forecast are the following: overall panel probit model accuracy for Ukraine is 97.52%, for Russia 57.93% and for the cross-country model is 61.99% 
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for Russia, 84.08% for Ukraine and 65.18% for the cross-country model. Hence, we do not find 
the evidence here that our cross-country model outperforms the models for Ukraine and Russia. 
4.4.4 OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECAST 
One more way, which is commonly used in evaluating the performance of statistical models, is 
an out-of-sample forecast. Sometimes the predictive power of the estimated model is evaluated 
taking the data for future periods of time and if those are not available, the data for the past 
periods are used. In our case the data on the bank’s parameters nor for future, neither for the past 
periods for the both of the countries is available. That is why we apply procedure similar to the 
predictive Chow-test. Following the previous researchers, for instance, Peresetsky et al. (2004), 
we randomly select observations from our main sample of reliable and failed banks (we kept the 
percentage of failures equal to initial sample). Then these observations are excluded from the 
main sample. As a next step, the pooled probit is estimated for the bigger sample and evaluated 
for the smaller one. Hence, for Russia we get two samples: the first contains 5823 observations 
among which 115 failures and the second contains 200 observations with 10 failures. For 
Ukraine we get the estimation sample of 931 observations (22 failures) and the prediction sample 
consists of 200 observations with 9 bankruptcies and for the cross-country model the estimation 
and prediction samples consist of 6785 (137) and 400 (19) observations, respectively. The 
prediction results are shown in the Table 4.3. For the two domestic and the cross-country models 
overall accuracy in predicting the default of the banks is almost equal (close to 95%), but only 
for the correct prediction of survival banks. The number of correct predictions of the defaults for 
both domestic and cross-country models is zero. But these results are not surprising, taking into 
account the fact that only few coefficients are found to be statistically significant and the model 
is not correctly specified for Russian and cross-country sample. 
Table 4.3 Out-of-sample forecast implemented with pooled probit 
 
 y=0 y=1 total y=0 y=1 total y=0 y=1 total 
 Russia Ukraine Cross-country 
P(y=1)≤C 190 10 200 191 9 200 381 19 400 
P(y=1)>C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 190 10 200 191 9 200 381 19 400 
Correct 190 0 190 191 0 191 381 0 381 
% Correct 100.00 0 95.00 100.00 0 95.50 100.00 0 95.25 
% Incorrect 0 100.00 5.00 0 100 4.50 0 100.00 4.75 
 
In addition, similar to Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2003) we would like to present the ranking list of 
the banks according to the estimated probability of bankruptcy (using pooled probit). We create 
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two groups of 12 banks27 with a small and big probability to fail for Ukrainian, Russian and the 
cross-country models. We name them the “white list” and the “black list”, respectively 
(Appendix 8). But according to the information published on the web-pages of central banks of 
Russia and Ukraine, not any of the banks from our “black list” has financial difficulties at the 
moment. This gives us one more evidence that the variables, which we include in the model and 
the form of the model does not predict the bank failure for a given sample and a given period of 
time correctly.  
  
                                                             
27 We choose only “alive” banks to see what probability of their failure gives our model.  
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5. Conclusions 
In this Master essay we use the linear probability and the binary choice models for the analysis 
of financial ratios, which are drawn from the publicly available financial statements of Russian 
and Ukrainian banks for the period 2002-2008. The two purposes are specified for the study:  1) 
to investigate which parameters are significant in the prediction of bank failure for the sample of 
Russian and Ukrainian banks for the first decade of this century; 2) to see if there are any similar 
factors, which drive the bank to bankruptcy in both countries. 
 
First of all we need to emphasize that the output of econometric probability models is very 
sensitive to the quality of initial data and the variation in the dependent variable. For instance, 
the number of defaults in Ukrainian sample is the double of defaults in Russian sample and 
moreover according to the specification tests the model is correctly specified. Consequently, we 
have got the results that Ukrainian pooled probit shows the greatest number of correctly 
predicted defaults in comparison with Russian and cross-country models for in-sample forecast. 
Even though it does not indicate the good predictive power out-of-sample, the estimates of 
significant coefficients have the meaningful sign. For instance, such variables are found to be 
significant for the bank failure: the capitalization and profitability measures and the size of the 
bank. All of them influence the default of the bank negatively, thus, the more profitable and 
bigger the bank is - the smaller the probability of its insolvency. Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2003) in 
his analysis of Ukrainian banks for period 1998-2003 also finds that bank`s size does matter for 
the failures of the banks for a given period. However, in contrast to him we do not find the 
significant influence of the deposits to total assets ratio on the bank`s ability to survive. The 
possible explanation for this is that in comparison with his period of study, today people’s 
confidence in the banks in Ukraine has increased and it is less important (at least based on the 
evidence from our data) than profitability and capitalization measures.  
 
For the sample of the Russian banks the size of the bank is not found to be significant for the 
probability of default. Only the coefficient of return on assets ratio (ROA) is significant and has 
the expected sign. The capital on assets ratio (CTA) is also significant, but it has the opposite 
direction of influence in comparison with Ukrainian one and the theoretical suggestions. 
Nevertheless, it is in line with the previous study of Russian banks failures by Konstandina 
(2006). She explains this by the possible risk aversion of the less capitalized banks.  
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As to the second objective of our study, we only have one significant variable with the same 
effect on bank failure, which is common for the both countries. It is the return on assets (ROA). 
And this is not surprisingly as it is often found to be an important indicator of the bank 
performance. For instance, Sheldon (1996) at his study of the bank’s default probability in 
international comparison based on accounting data, used return on asset as a variable that has a 
great impact on banks probability to fail. The capital to total assets ratio (CTA) is also significant 
in both countries, but if in the Ukrainian case it influences the failure of the bank negatively, then 
for the sample of Russian banks it has the opposite sign. The possible explanation for this fact 
can be given as following: to our knowledge (according for example the Intelace research28) 
Ukrainian banks are undercapitalized in comparison with other Central and East European banks, 
but some of the Russian banks are overcapitalized. Probably the less capitalized banks (which 
dominate in Ukraine) may recognize their weaknesses and do not undertake risky operations, in 
contrast with banks with big capital (dominating in Russia), which are more confident and thus 
can actively work with subprime mortgages, for instance. Hence, the capitalization of the banks 
in Russia influences the probability of their defaults positively in contrast to Ukrainian sample. 
One more difference between the countries is that the size of the bank negatively influences the 
default of the bank for Ukrainian sample and does not have any influence for the sample of 
Russian banks. We can guess that the regional difference inside Russian Federation is much 
more significant than the difference in economic conditions in different regions of Ukraine, 
hence some other regional factors can have greater influence on the default of the bank in Russia 
than its size. Also, such variable as loan to total assets (LTA) is not found to be significant in 
Ukraine, but it is significant in Russia. Intuitively, this variable is expected to have the influence 
on the default of the bank because if the bank has the great number of issued loans and they are 
not paid back, this makes the bank insolvent. However, the insignificance of this variable for 
Ukrainian case possibly can be caused by the smaller sample of Ukrainian banks in comparison 
with Russian. 
 
Finally, we conclude that despite some similarities, there are the differences in forces driving the 
banks to default in two countries. Such conclusion partly contradicts the results of Montgomery, 
Santoso et al. (2005), who find that their cross-country model out-performs the domestic models 
in predictive power for the case of Indonesia and Japan. This, in their words, can stimulate the 
regional cooperation on this issue.  We cannot argue that our findings reject the necessity of 
cooperation between the former Soviet republics in the issue of prevention of systemic banking 
crisis. Inversely, the cooperation is important and it is even already exists. For instance, in 
                                                             28  See http://www.intelace.com. 
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January 2009 Vnesheconombank of Russia has bought 75% of shares of one of the insolvent 
Ukrainian banks. This fact can be taken as an example of cooperation in prevention of financial 
crisis in Ukraine, because the problem bank is reactivated now and starts the repayment of its 
debts. But nevertheless, too close cooperation always has the danger to become the expansion. 
That is why, we reckon, the regulatory policy of central banks on the local levels still remains the 
most important in healthy functioning of the banking sector.  
 
Further research in this area could focus on estimating the binary choice models under the 
relaxed assumptions (for example semi-parametrically), calculating the marginal effect of the 
influence of each variable and using some additional variables, for example the liquidity ratios, 
macroeconomic variables and country dummies multiplied by year dummies. 
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Appendixes 
 
APPENDIX 1 
Variables description 
Name of 
Variable Description 
CTD Capital/Deposits 
CTA Capital/Assets 
LTA Loans/Total assets 
LTD Loans/Deposits 
ROA Profit /Total assets 
ROC Profit /Capital 
DTA Deposits/Total assets 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
CD Country Dummy 
D2002 Dummy for year 2002 
D2003 Dummy for year 2003 
D2004 Dummy for year 2004 
D2005 Dummy for year 2005 
D2006 Dummy for year 2006 
D2007 Dummy for year 2007 
CD_CTA Country Dummy multipled by Capital/Assets 
CD_CTD Country Dummy multipled by Capital/Deposits 
CD_DTA Country Dummy multipled by Deposits/Total assets 
CD_LTA Country Dummy multipled by Loans/Total assets 
CD_LTD Country Dummy multipled by Loans/Deposits 
CD_ROA Country Dummy multipled by Profit /Total assets 
CD_ROC Country Dummy multipled by Profit /Capital 
CD_SIZE Country Dummy multipled by Natural logarithm of total assets 
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APPENDIX 2 
Estimation results29 for the sample of Ukrainian banks 
 
  
                                                             29 Corresponding t-statistics is in parentheses.  30 The standard errors in the linear regression are adjusted for heteroskedasticity in all the estimation results below (Newey-West standard errors). 
*** significant at 1% level. 
**  significant at 5% level. 
*    significant at 10% level. 
Series Linear regression for 
pooled data30 Probit for pooled data 
Probit random effect for panel 
data 
CTA -0.220585 
(-1.900410) 
-1.634459** 
(-2.194597) 
-1.776257* 
(-1.78) 
CTD 9.00E-05 
(0.569888) 
-0.002542 
(-0.222859) 
-0.0031509 
(-0.23) 
D2002 -0.144747*** 
(-2.999643) 
-1.371281** 
(-2.412303) 
-1.761087 
(-1.64) 
D2003 -0.103904** 
(-2.516241) 
-0.923105* 
(-1.730951) 
-1.209508 
(-1.41) 
D2004 -0.123764*** 
(-2.875946) 
-1.838931** 
(-2.423553) 
-2.322872* 
(-1.75) 
D2005 -0.108231*** 
(-2.749991) 
-1.235134** 
(-2.161011) 
-1.552961* 
(-1.68) 
D2006 -0.108788** 
(-2.556144) 
-1.092300** 
(-2.017402) 
-1.352361* 
(-1.67) 
D2007 -0.046596 
(-0.983384) 
-0.311648 
(-0.608720) 
-0.3873689 
(-0.62) 
DTA -0.080225 
(-1.256677) 
-0.799436 
(-1.126320) 
-0.9082015 
(-1.00) 
LTA 0.036156 
(0.865585) 
0.392348 
(0.624137) 
0.4569461 
(0.58) 
LTD -0.000103 
(-0.365933) 
-0.036360 
(-0.502195) 
-0.0499911 
(-0.52) 
ROA -0.245230*** 
(-2.715529) 
-4.962900*** 
(-3.149303) 
-5.676973** 
(2.57) 
ROC 0.028192 
(0.794574) 
-0.009238 
(-0.072405) 
0.0071799 
(0.05) 
SIZE -0.021760** 
(-2.132050) 
-0.165049*** 
(-2.780481) 
-0.1892631** 
(-2.08) 
c 0.497211** 
(2.276339) 
1.801760** 
(2.089966) 
2.071793 
(1.64) 
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APPENDIX 3 
Estimation results31 for the sample of Russian Banks 
 
Series Linear regression for 
pooled data 
Probit for pooled data 
Probit random effect 
for panel data 
CTA     0.068088*** 
(3.164607) 
1.016878*** 
(3.175926) 
1.016833*** 
(3.18) 
CTD 7.93E-05 
(1.398278) 
0.000753** 
(1.972890) 
0.0007533** 
(1.97) 
D2002 -0.018386** 
(-2.525580) 
-0.343360** 
(-2.506138) 
-0.3433236** 
(-2.51) 
D2003 -0.014454** 
(-1.990725) 
-0.258744** 
(-1.975804) 
-0.2587149** 
(-1.98) 
D2004 -0.002886 
(-0.379594) 
-0.067142 
(-0.565457) 
-0.0671256 
(-0.57) 
D2005 -0.016090** 
(-2.318448) 
-0.324034** 
(-2.414727) 
-0.3240139** 
(-2.41) 
D2006 -0.016462** 
(-2.403341) 
-0.333483** 
(-2.472794) 
-0.3334667** 
(-2.47) 
DTA 0.008929 
(0.891310) 
0.185528 
(0.686921) 
0.1855243 
(0.69) 
LTA -0.027056** 
(-2.323087) 
-0.474011** 
(-2.570157) 
-0.4739938** 
(-2.57) 
LTD -1.92E-05 
(-1.518648) 
-0.000417 
(-1.223902) 
-0.0004168 
(-1.22) 
ROA -0.216184** 
(-1.989822) 
-4.374001** 
(-2.161075) 
-4.373835** 
(-2.16) 
ROC -0.001233 
(-0.075861) 
-0.265895 
(-0.676793) 
-0.2659144 
(-0.68) 
SIZE 0.001383 
(1.194290) 
0.023316 
(0.910843) 
0.0233167 
(0.91) 
c 0.011413 
(0.493405) 
-2.170115*** 
(-4.328789) 
-2.170067*** 
(-4.33) 
 
  
                                                             31 Corresponding t-statistics is in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1% level. 
**  significant at 5% level. 
*    significant at 10% level.  
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APPENDIX 4 
Estimation results32 for cross-country model 
                                                             32 Corresponding t-statistics is in parentheses.  
*** significant at 1% level. 
**   significant at 5% level. 
*     significant at 10% level.   
Series Linear regression for pooled data Probit for pooled data 
Probit random effect for panel 
data 
CD -0.003619 
(-0.074643) 
-0.839376 
(-0.486361) 
-0.8393585 
(-0.79) 
CD_CTA 0.101970*** 
(3.133996) 
4.180962* 
(1.919912) 
4.180823* 
(1.92) 
CD_CTD 7.97E-05 
(0.900311) 
0.005996 
(0.051064) 
0.0059955 
(0.05) 
CD_DTA 0.007942 
(0.305761) 
2.290791 
(1.235877) 
2.290703 
(1.24) 
CD_LTA -0.047942* 
(-1.903068) 
-2.679423 
(-1.423332) 
-2.679323 
(-1.42) 
CD_LTD -4.51E-05 
(-0.375792) 
0.918875 
(1.095804) 
0.9188393 
(1.10) 
CD_ROA -0.195309* 
(-1.797141) 
-5.336524** 
(-2.207397) 
-5.33638** 
(-2.21) 
CD_ROC 0.009386 
(0.547363) 
1.590929 
(0.855585) 
1.590853 
(0.86) 
CD_SIZE 0.001826 
(0.480076) 
0.035631 
(0.311779) 
0.0356307 
(0.31) 
CTA -0.033831 
(-1.369397) 
-3.167936 
(-1.470551) 
-3.167833 
(-1.47) 
CTD -3.87E-07 
(-0.005713) 
-0.005243 
(-0.044653) 
-0.0052428 
(-0.04) 
D2002 -0.018076*** 
(-2.585208) 
-0.355661*** 
(-2.604057) 
-0.3556328*** 
(-2.60) 
D2003 -0.014335** 
(-2.076838) 
-0.269794** 
(-2.067212) 
-0.2697711** 
(-2.07) 
D2004 -0.004055 
(-0.564061) 
-0.078039 
(-0.659769) 
-0.0780258 
(-0.66) 
D2005 -0.015978** 
(-2.410460) 
-0.334030** 
(-2.496937) 
-0.3340138** 
(-2.50) 
D2006 -0.016339** 
(-2.503750) 
-0.344543** 
(-2.562742) 
-0.3445295** 
(-2.56) 
D2007 0.070359*** 
(2.965270) 
1.618528*** 
(2.745140) 
1.618489*** 
(2.75) 
DTA 0.001038 
(0.042340) 
-2.111022 
(-1.150352) 
-2.110936 
(-1.15) 
LTA 0.020988 
(0.945148) 
2.204247 
(1.176694) 
2.204161 
(1.18) 
LTD 2.59E-05 
(0.216948) 
-0.919291 
(-1.096300) 
-0.9192555 
(-1.10) 
ROA -0.021185 
(-1.389676) 
0.964779 
(0.731276) 
0.9647707 
(0.73) 
ROC -0.010750* 
(-1.908494) 
-1.856461 
(-1.021359) 
-1.856401 
(-1.02) 
SIZE -0.000444 
(-0.121353) 
-0.012968 
(-0.116331) 
-0.0129676 
(-0.12) 
c 0.015065 
(0.328782) 
-1.308337 
(-0.785621) 
-1.308315 
(-0.79) 
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APPENDIX 5 
Specification tests  
  Chi-squared critical values   
Test 
statistic 
1% 
significance 
5% 
significance  
10% 
significance  
p-
value
Probit for pooled data 
Heteroskeasticity tests (LM test) 
Cross-Country model (22 df) 107.8747 40.289  33.924 30.813 0.0000
Ukraine (14df) 29.16973 29.141 23.685 21.064 0.0099
Russia (13 df) 46.61191 27.688 22.362 19.812 0.0000
Normality test (LM test, 2 df)     
Cross-Country model  10.93408 
       9.210 5.991 4.605 
0.0042
Ukraine  7.273554 0.0263
Russia  3.276221 0.1943
Linear regression Model 
Breusch-Pagan Heteroskedasticity 
test           
Cross-Country model (22 df) 119.8838 40.289  33.924 30.813 0.0000
Ukraine (14df) 58.16560 29.141  23.685 21.064 0.0000
Russia (13 df) 64.54841 27.688 22.362 19.812 0.0000
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APPENDIX 6 Histograms of linear regression models residuals 
Figure A6.1 Sample of Ukrainian banks 
 
Figure A6.2 Sample of Russian banks 
 
Figure A6.2 Cross-country sample 
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APPENDIX 7 
Table A7.1 Results of Wald test with H0: specific country coefficients (CD, CD_CTA, 
CD_CTD, CD_DTA, CD_LTA, CD_LTD, CD_ROA, CD_ROC, CD_SIZE) are equal to zero 
  Chi-squared critical values (9 df)   
Test 
statistic 
1% 
significance 
5% 
significance 
10% 
significance 
p-
value
Probit for pooled data 
Cross-Country model  17.78 21.666 16.919 14.684 0.0378
Probit random effect for panel data 
Cross-Country model  17.78 21.666 16.919 14.684 0.0378
Linear regression Model 
Cross-Country model  70.68 21.666 16.919 14.684 0.0000
 
Table A7.2 Results of Wald test with H0: all time dummies are equal to zero 
  Chi-squared critical values   
Test 
statistic 
1% 
significance  
5% 
significance  
10% 
significance  
p-
value
Probit for pooled data 
Cross-Country model (6 df) 24.04 16.812 12.592 10.645 0.0005
Ukraine (6 df) 37.74 16.812 12.592 10.645 0.0000
Russia (5 df) 13.45 15.086 11.070 9.236 0.0195
Probit random effect for panel data 
Cross-Country model (6 df) 24.04 16.812 12.592 10.645 0.0005
Ukraine (6 df) 37.74 16.812 12.592 10.645 0.0000
Russia (5 df) 13.45 15.086 11.070 9.236 0.0195
Linear regression Model 
Cross-Country model (6 df) 14.61 16.812 12.592 10.645 0.0122
Ukraine (6 df) 47.01 16.812 12.592 10.645 0.0000
Russia (5 df) 43.56 15.086 11.070 9.236 0.0000
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APPENDIX 8 
Table A8.1 Lists of banks in Ukraine with the high and low probability to fail next year, 
predicted by the domestic probit model 
 
“white list” “black list” 
Name  Probability to fail Name  Probability to fail 
OTP bank 0.022402 Olympic Ukraine 0.132893 
Industrialbank 0.032743 Accent-bank 0.132408 
Khreschatuk 0.042011 Veles 0.124235 
Kreditprombank 0.043139 Invest-Credit bank 0.116038 
VAB bank 0.052127 Contract 0.115473 
Active bank 
0.052546 Agrarian Commercial 
bank 
0.099257 
Concord 0.063247 Coopinvestbank 0.097349 
Partner bank 0.073174 TMM-bank 0.095471 
Universal bank 0.078794 Trust-Capital 0.095311 
Kredobank 0.083047 Home Credit bank 0.095057 
Industrial-Export 
bank 
0.084025 
Pivdencombank 
0.093824 
Ikar-bank 0.084534 Grant 0.092039 
Average probability 0.059316 Average probability 0.107447 
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Table A8.2 Lists of banks in Russia with the high and low probability to fail next year, predicted 
by the domestic probit model 
“white list” “black list” 
Name  Probability to fail Name  Probability to fail 
Morskoy bank 0.020991 
Primorskiy 
territorialniy 
0.027653 
Uralprivatbank 0.021603 Smmit bank 0.027718 
Dalcombank 0.022129 Aleksandrovskiy 0.027788 
Unicreditbank 0.022392 Tempbank 0.028296 
Energomashbank 0.022776 Baltiyskiy 0.030183 
Russkobank 0.024049 Kemsocinbank 0.030353 
Investbank 0.024064 Energobank 0.030408 
Kolco Urala 0.025076 Centrocredit 0.031737 
Avtovazbank 0.025209 Etalonbank 0.033144 
Kuban 0.025299 Credit-Moskow 0.033867 
Merkuriy 0.026032 Raschetno-Creditniy 0.035157 
Selmashbank 0.026082 BKS-Investicionniy 0.043497 
Average probability 0.023809 Average probability 0.03165 
 
  
48  
Table A8.3 Lists of banks in Russia and Ukraine with the high and low probability to fail next 
year, predicted by the cross-country probit model 
“white list” “black list” 
Name  Probability to 
fail 
Name  Probability to fail 
OTP bank 0.044702 Veles 0.124696 
Accent-bank 0.057823 Ikar-bank 0.106187 
Industrialbank 0.059391 Concord 0.102681 
Kreditprombank 0.060109 Agrarian Commercial bank 0.09626 
VAB bank 0.064014 Contract 0.091168 
Industrial-Export bank 0.064727 Partner bank 0.090927 
Khreschatuk 0.065795 Coopinvestbank 0.089489 
Universal bank 0.066947 TMM-bank 0.086711 
Home Credit bank 0.071564 Olympic Ukraine 0.08635 
Trust-Capital 0.074658 Grant 0.08458 
Pivdencombank 0.075506 Invest-Credit bank 0.083749 
Kredobank 0.080165 Active bank 0.080166 
Average probability 0.06545 Average probability 0.09358 
Unicreditbank 0.015113 Credit-Moskow 0.032429 
Centrocredit 0.025042 Primorskiy territorialniy 0.029560 
Russkobank 0.021793 Aleksandrovskiy 0.026662 
Avtovazbank 0.020301 Tempbank 0.027368 
Energomashbank 0.023206 Smmit bank 0.030245 
Kolco Urala 0.023448 Kemsocinbank 0.033295 
Energobank 0.022388 Etalonbank 0.028900 
Morskoy bank 0.021140 BKS-Investicionniy 0.040344 
Dalcombank 0.018232 Raschetno-Creditniy 0.026029 
Kuban 0.025657 Baltiyskiy 0.026718 
Selmashbank 0.025934 Merkuriy 0.026076 
Average probability 0.022064 Average probability 0.030537 
Average probability for 
2 countries 
0.043757 Average probability for 2 
countries 
0.066562 
 
